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		THE BURNING BUSH:  THE RATIONALITY OF BELIEF
                                                                IN MIRACLES

	Years ago, when I was an undergraduate studying philosophy, I happened to be watching The Dick Cavett Show one evening when the host introduced his old philosophy teacher from Yale, Paul Weiss.  This attracted my attention, since I had heard of Weiss and was not at all used to seeing philosophy professors on late-night television (or in any popular medium, for that matter.)  During the course of Cavett's interview with Weiss, the question of God's existence was broached, with Weiss maintaining that there could be no evidence in principle relevant to deciding the question of God's existence.  "But", asked Cavett, "What if God appeared to you?"  "How would I know that it's God?" replied Weiss, thus ending the discussion.  At the time, I found myself more or less in agreement with Weiss - I had even anticipated his response to Cavett prior to Weiss's making it.  Like Weiss, I was more likely to question my senses or my sanity than believe that I was the recipient of a personal revelation or communication from God, even though I was not then (and am not now) an atheist.  I even remember thinking to myself that this was probably why God had not vouchsafed me any such revelations - my philosophical sophistication, I imagined, had imbued me with so much skepticism that it would be useless for God to communicate with me in this way.
	One thing which I did not do was question whether this skeptical attitude of mine was rationally justified.  I simply took it for granted, as did Hume, that reports of miraculous interventions by God in nature were so antecedently improbable that it was much more likely that those who reported those events were mistaken, mad or simply lying than that their reports were true, hence that no such reports could ever be credible. Or, at any rate, not on the basis of sense-experience or the testimony of witnesses, no matter how otherwise reliable.  While I did accept as literally true the essential or foundational miracles of the Catholic faith, such as the Incarnation, Resurrection, Virgin Birth, Transubstantiation, etc., I accepted them 
solely on faith, i.e., simply because they were authoritatively taught by scripture and tradition and had no particular interest in attempting to justify such claims on the basis of evidence.  That was a preoccupation of "fundamentalists", i.e., irrational, fanatical Christians who allowed their antecedent religious commitments dictate their beliefs, regardless of reason and evidence.  I was a philosopher and therefore above this sort of thing.
	I don't think I was altogether to blame for having imbibed this sort of attitude.  After all, when I was an undergraduate (in the 1970's) the dismissive, Humean attitude toward religion was firmly entrenched  in American philosophy departments, especially those in secular universities.  Most of my teachers were ideological atheists and many militantly so; those who were "soft" on religion (i.e., less than completely antipathetic toward it) tended to keep their heads down.  The few philosophers in good standing who broadcast their religious beliefs and commitments (such as Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe) were looked upon as harmless eccentrics whose religious interests could be forgiven and overlooked because they had done "good work" in areas of philosophy that had not been tainted by their religious views.  As I look back on this time in my life from the perspective of thirty years on, taking into account all the changes in philosophy since then, it strikes me that I grew up in an extremely narrow-minded and oppressive intellectual atmosphere; yet, although I felt the pinch a little myself, it did not seem that way at the time.
	Be that as it may, I no longer think that Hume was right to be so dismissive of miracle claims as I once did; in particular, I no longer think that the attitude that Hume, Weiss and even I myself in my younger days evinced is, after all, obviously rational or even rationally defensible.  To the contrary, it now strikes me as merely anti-religious prejudice and wishful thinking masquerading as Reason - with a capital R - and one which too many philosophers have uncritically imbibed and propagated, as I did in my callow youth, from 
their anti-theistic preceptors.  Whether or not this impression is distorted by overreaction to my youthful views I am not at present able to tell.  At any rate, I believe that I have sufficient reason to call my youthful views into question on this point.  In this paper I shall attempt to say why.

Normative Rationality - There is perhaps no more term used by philosophers more frequently but with less concern for its meaning than the term reason and its variants such as rational and rationality.  For one thing, these terms are almost always used normatively, as the name for "something good", something which we ought to have or to be, something distinctively or paradigmatically human, the source of our dignity and worth as persons, something we ought to strive to realize as an ideal and conform to in all our thoughts and actions.  However, this is rarely accompanied by any objective, non-normative account of what reason is supposed to be. If we look at reason in purely cognitive terms, then reason or intellect is simply a faculty or power we possess by means of which we self-consciously frame and attempt to answer questions of various kinds.  So conceived, reason or intellect is nothing but a tool and in no way directs usfor or against any particular set of views as such, despite the impression one would get from the editors and contributors to magazines like Reason, The Skeptical Inquirer, The Rationalist Annual, American Atheist Forum and so on.  But, then, is the notion of rationality and the philosophumenon “Be rational!”simply empty of normative content?  Not at all.  However, the normative content of the concept of reason needs to be clarified and related to its objective, non-normative meaning, not simply identified with whatever one happens to antecedently desire or even suspect will result from its systematic employment.
	Perhaps the point of contact is this.  Philosophers, though certainly not they alone, are committed to the pursuit of truth in theoretical matters, and most philosophers believe that the use of reason is the best way to arrive at those truths.  Thus, to the extent that we make truth our aim we ought also employ rational methods in order to achieve that end.  To make truth our aim means that we strive to increase the number of true beliefs in our possession and diminish the number of false beliefs we possess.  In light of this, let us say that a person would be objectively rational if he or she possessed all and only true beliefs; this would be to attain the ideal of theoretical knowledge, or what Aristotle called theoretical wisdom.  Of course, none of us 
actually instantiates this ideal.  Still, to the extent that we adopt truth as our aim, we appear to be committed to a whole-hearted pursuit of the ideal and thus to the use of reason (whatever this amounts to) to approximate this goal to as high a degree as is feasible.  So let us say that a person is subjectively rational to the extent that he or she undertakes the pursuit of objective rationality.  Since philosophers (at least traditionally) take the pursuit of truth through the use of reason (in a sense still to be specified) as the very essence of their discipline, it would seem that anyone who is a philosopher ought to be whole-heartedly committed to the cultivation of subjective rationality.
	Here, however, agreement comes to an end.  For in order for us to pursue the ideal, we need to have some conception of the proper scheme, program or method for progressively approximating objective rationality through the cultivation of subjective rationality.  The preoccupation with method is, as has often been noted, very much the hallmark of modern philosophy, which grew up out of the smoldering ruins of the medieval worldview from the soil of the Renaissance but at the same time in the shadow of the New Science.  Philosophers as diverse as Bacon and Hobbes, Descartes and Spinoza, Locke and Kant, Hegel and Husserl all attempted to provide the foundation for such a program or method to guide subjective rationality toward the goal, and their proposals were as diverse as those philosophers themselves.
	A couple of examples should suffice in illustration of my thesis.  Descartes proposes to provide a foundation for subjective rationality on the following basic program (which I am here oversimplifying due to considerations of space):
	1.  Doubt all propositions which are even possibly false and
	2.  affirm only those propositions which are either indubitable or infallibly deducible
	     from propositions which are indubitable.
In like manner, another French philosopher, Auguste Comte, makes his own proposal for cultivating subjective rationality and thus approximating philosophical wisdom:
	1.  Entertain only those questions that are resolvable using the methods of natural 
	     science and
	2.  accept only those propositions which are verified by the use of those methods.
Although these proposals are radically different, each philosopher intends to guide us toward wisdom by providing us with a scheme or method for approximating the ideal of objective rationality.  I will not delay us here by attempting a critique of these proposals; they have been criticized often enough by others and the main lines of those criticisms will be familiar enough to most philosophers.  Instead, what I propose to do is to offer my own program for subjective rationality, one that I think is less radical than the proposals one meets with in Descartes or Comte, but which is still adequate to orient us toward the goal of philosophical inquiry.

A Proposal for Subjective Rationality - There is no reason, on the face of it, for supposing that there is anything systematically wrong with my cognitive faculties, i.e., those intellectual or rational capacities by means of which I acquire my beliefs about the nature of things.  Indeed, if I were to seriously entertain this possibility, I should find myself utterly without resources to demonstrate otherwise.    Of course, this does not prove that I am right in believing that my cognitive faculties are fundamentally sound.  However, since the opposite supposition is self-stultifying, if I am to proceed  at all I must be willing to assume at least this much.  Even a skeptic can do no less - even Descartes pulled back from considering the possibility that he was insane and thus incapable of the discriminating exercise of his rational faculties.  Thus, the very possibility of a skeptical critique of my cognitive faculties appears to presuppose precisely what the skeptic wants to call into question, and thus to fatally undermine any such program before it even begins.
	On the assumption that my cognitive faculties are basically sound, i.e., not in any way systematically flawed or incapable of arriving at the truth about substantive matters of fact, it is reasonable for me to believe that most of my spontaneously occurring beliefs are true.  After all, to believe that my cognitive faculties are fundamentally sound is nothing more than to believe the contrary of the claim that those faculties are systematically flawed, hence have no tendency to lead us to the truth, which then amounts to the claim that those faculties, when used in the proper manner, will tend to lead us to the truth and to be generally self-correcting.
	If the foregoing is correct, then there is a presumption in favor of the truth of my spontaneously occurring beliefs, i.e., the non-inferential beliefs produced by the operation of mycognitive faculties, and it is rational for me to take those beliefs at face value for the most part andreject individual beliefs, or revise the whole set of my beliefs, only when there is evident reason for me to do so.  I would also argue that such an approach is methodologically rational as well ;after all, the prima facie best explanation for X appearing to be F is that X is F; why suppose a more complicated explanation without just cause or reason?  So the necessary presumption that my faculties are basically sound coincides with what appears to be a sound methodological principle which can at least serve as a starting point for subjective rationality, and which we might formulate as the following principle, which I call the Experiential Presumption (EP):

	(EP)  If X appears to be F, then it is prima facie reasonable to believe that X is F.

The EP thus formulated will naturally lead, at least at first, to a version of common sense realism as perhaps Aristotle or Thomas Reid might have formulated it.  As such, it will strike many philosophers as too conservative a strategy for the pursuit of objective rationality, as one which will merely reinforce everyday prejudices and encourage complacency with regard to the pursuit of truth.  After all, why inquire at all if the very presuppositions of inquiry require that most of our spontaneously occurring beliefs are going to turn out true?  Where would modern science be if such a view had always prevailed and common-sense Aristotelian physics had never been questioned?
	These are legitimate worries and serious questions; let me briefly respond as follows.  First of all, it  must be emphasized that the EP is merely a starting point for rational inquiry - indeed, it is hard to imagine, as a practical matter, how else one could possibly begin - and is only prima facie.  As such, a follower of the EP is not committed to the position that there are any propositions of the form X is F expressing our spontaneously occurring beliefs that will survive rational scrutiny ultima facie.  In principle, it is possible to begin from the EP and end up agreeing with Wilfrid Sellars that the common sense picture of the world is utterly false and to be replaced wholesale with a straightforward physicalism.  As a matter of fact, I don't agree with Sellars about this and would be prepared to argue, in the appropriate context, that there are in fact limits on how much a realist view of modern science can undermine the common sense picture of the world.  Still, this is a matter for separate philosophical treatment and not something that can be decided or ruled out by mere methodological fiat.  Secondly, part of supposing that our cognitive faculties are fundamentally sound is that they are self-correcting, i.e., erroneous beliefs produced by those faculties tend not to persist and are instead detectible in principle.  Thus, despite the strong methodological presumption in favor of Aristotelian physics and the powerful cultural and intellectual forces which resisted its replacement, the combined weight of the discoveries of  Copernicus, Galileo and Newton proved in the end to be too strong to be ignored and finally gained universal acceptance among all rational inquirers.  Explicit commitment to the EP would not and will not prevent such changes, though arguably it might contribute to an orderly procession or transition from view to view and paradigm to paradigm, something which more radical accounts of conceptual change in the sciences (e.g., those of Kuhn, Feyerabend and the anti-Realists) cannot guarantee.   Even though the pursuit of truth undoubtedly requires that we take risks and make bold conjectures that we cannot currently prove and which may fly in the face of currently established views, there still needs to be some limits on unchecked speculation in philosophy and science. Otherwise, the entire notion of a genuine community of inquirers be lost and science become the province of imaginative but irresponsible cranks moving effortlessly on the frictionless plane of pure theory. I suggest that the EP may serve as an effective brake speculation of this sort.
	All of this, however, is to speak in the abstract.  I have yet to say what our cognitive faculties are and how the EP applies in each case to their deliverances.  Although I can hardly do justice to this topic here, let me briefly outline the sources of spontaneous belief and illustrate the application of the EP to each case.

Sources of Spontaneous Belief - The sources of spontaneous belief as I reckon them are the following:  rational intuition, sense-perception, introspection, memory, spontaneous induction and testimony.  Let us consider each in turn.

Rational Intuition - Rational intuition is the source of putatively self-evident beliefs such as the principle of logic and mathematics as well as the other standard examples of a priori knowledge. These include Descartes's cogito, principles such as that the whole is greater than the part, all bachelors are unmarried, nothing can be both red and green all over at the same time, etc.  Although philosophers from Leibniz to the logical positivists have attempted to characterize all such claims as merely "analytic", reports of linguistic conventions or as (merely) conceptual truths, contemporary philosophers, among them Roderick Chisholm and Laurence Bonjour, have exposed the bankruptcy of these attempts to eliminate the category of a priori 
knowledge.  It certainly seems to us to be the case that there are self-evident truths, i.e., truths we know to be true in the very act of understanding them and that some of these are substantive truths.  Further, there are numerous examples of such statements about which we have not even the slightest suspicion as to their truth, but which possess the full measure of subjective certainty for us.  Given the EP, the most likely explanation of this fact is that these truths are indeed self-evident and objectively certain for us.  Thus, the appropriate version of the EP for such cases would be the following, where P = proposition:

	EP(1-RI)  The prima facie best explanation for P's appearing to be self-evident is
                                 that P is self-evident.

Of course, not every statement which possesses apparent self-evidence (such as the fifth postulate of Euclidian geometry) turns out, on consideration, to be actually so, and some apparently self-evident principles (such as the Principle of Sufficient Reason) remain controversial - though not, in my opinion, for any good reason.  Nevertheless, the fact that apparently sane and sober individuals can sometimes be mistaken about whether or not a particular statement is self-evident is no more a reason for rejecting rational intuition as a source of spontaneous belief any more than occasional perceptual errors ought to lead us to reject sense-perception as a source of spontaneous belief about the external world.  Indeed, unless we were willing to accept at least some of the deliverances of this faculty (e.g., the truth of the principle of non-contradiction, the validity of modus ponens, etc.) rational discourse itself would be impossible.

Sense-Perception - The most obvious application of the EP is to the case of sense-perception, the most maligned of all the sources of spontaneous belief.  Here the appropriate version of the EP would be stated as follows, where O = perceptual object and F = any property of that object.

	EP(2-SP) The prima facie best explanation for O's appearing to be F is that O is F.

Two direct applications of EP(2-SP) would be the following:

	EP(2-SP)A  The prima facie best explanation for any O's appearing to be an 
            independently existing external object is that it is such an object.

	EP(2-SP)B   The prima facie best explanation for any O's appearing to be (e.g.,)
            red (etc.) is that it is red.

Obviously, both of these application would require a good deal of further analysis and discussion than I can give them here.  The point, however, is that neither principle can be overturned simply by the fact that the senses are not infallible and that occasional perceptual errors are detected.  Not only are such occasions relatively rare, but natural science has been able to explain how and why most of these errors occur, thus making it possible to detect and avoid them in principle.

Introspection - Each of us is immediately aware of ourselves as a conscious subject with a rich inner life consisting of sensations, perceptions, feelings, emotions, kinaesthetic states, thoughts and so on.  Further, this awareness of ourselves as conscious beings is irreducible to any other source of spontaneous belief; it is thus the product of a special faculty of "inner perception" or introspection.  For the most part, the deliverances of this faculty are simply indubitable, possessing the special certainty of incorrigibility.  Indeed, I can be more certain that I am a self-conscious subject that I can be of anything else.  There is thus no prospect whatsoever of science someday disproving the existence of consciousness or refuting so-called "folk-psychology."  However, it remains that it is occasionally possible for me to go wrong even here, due to inadvertence, negligence, confusion and so on, such that my spontaneous beliefs about my own mental states are sometimes mistaken.  However, this occurs so rarely (and is generally so obvious when it does occur) that there is no reason to even formulate a version of the EP where introspection is concerned and quite incoherent to suppose that I could be systematically mistaken about the contents of my own mental states.

Memory -  Because introspection concerns only the contents of my consciousness, hence something of which I am typically incorrigibly aware, there is no need for a version of the EP to cover this case. However, since many of my mental states are intentional, i.e., have reference to (i.e., direct our thoughts to) something beyond themselves they putatively represent, we find a place where the EP naturally comes into play.  One such case is memory, which purports to represent to us our own experienced past.  Where memory is concerned, we have to distinguish between phenomenological memory (or putative memory) on the one hand and actual memory on the other.  In one sense, of course, it is impossible for there to be a false memory, since, by definition, I can only remember something if it really occurred and I really experienced it.  However, it is also true that not everything that I putatively remember (i.e., that presents itself to me as a memory in consciousness) constitutes an actual memory.  Hence, some phenomenological memories (i.e., mental events indistinguishable in quality from actual memories) constitute false memories in the sense that they purport to be actual memories without being so.  For this sort of situation, we may formulate the following version of the EP, where E = event:

               EP(3-M)  The prima facie best explanation for my seeming to remember E is 
	   that I actually do remember it.

One might balk at this principle, on the ground that some people have notoriously bad or unreliable memories.  However, in most cases where we describe someone as having a bad or a poor memory, we mean that they fail to remember what they have experienced or learned, not that they misremember those things.  Indeed, it is hard to imagine how one could constantly or systematically misremember one's own past and still retain any sense of personal identity over time.  As with all the other faculties I have mentioned, the occurrence of "false" memories or the phenomenon of misremembering is rare and infrequent and often admits of correction at the hands of the memories of others whose memories are thought to be more reliable than my own in the circumstances. This occurs, for example, in the case of one's early childhood memories easily trumped by the memories of those who were adults at the time.  In most contexts, however, we have no reason whatsoever to doubt that our putative memories are actual memories as well.

Spontaneous Induction - While inductive inference is at long last becoming recognized as a both a valuable and worthwhile topic for study among logicians, inductive inference (as Hume recognized) has its roots in a habit or, more likely, an  inherent disposition to anticipate the course of the  future on the basis of past observation of regularities in my experience.  It is this that I refer to here as spontaneous induction and which I would like to oppose to the other, more formal sort of inductive inference of interest to logicians.  Hume regards what I am here calling spontaneous induction a mere habit or instinct incapable of either rational analysis or interpretation.  Here I part company with Hume, proposing the following principle as the version of the EP appropriate to this context, which we might call the Principle of Causality:

	EP(4-C)  The prima facie best explanation for the observed regularities in my 	(perceptual) experience is that my experience reflects actual causal regularities in 
            nature.

On the basis of EP(4-C), it is reasonable to accept the further principle that the future will be like the past, thus providing rational grounding for the spontaneous inductive beliefs we constantly depend on to get us through every moment of every day and without which we would be utterly incapable of even the simplest forward-looking action.  Of course, once again, this principle is only prima facie and needs to be supplemented by empirical/scientific investigation into the causal processes underlying the experienced regularities which first lead us to anticipate the future based on the past in an effort to correct those anticipations where they are erroneous.  Even apart from this, however, we find that we only occasionally need to resist or revise the beliefs produced by spontaneous induction and find this practice (and the faculty which gives rise to it) reliable in the main, which no doubt explains in large part why we so unhesitatingly depend upon it both in science and in everyday life.

Testimony -  In 1979, Richard Swinburne, following Thomas Reid, formulated what he calls the Principle of Credulity, which we may here state as follows, where A = a person and E = event: 

	EP(5-T)  The prima facie best explanation for A's claiming that A experienced E
            is that A did in fact experience E.

A variant on this principle, which we might call the Principle of Authority, also figures in much of our everyday belief-formation can be briefly formulated as follows, where P = some factual claim or proposition:
	PA  It is reasonable to believe that P on the basis of authoritative testimony that P.


The Principle of Authority is not a basic principle, since it rests on the general reliability of testimony hence only indirectly on the most general form of the EP.  Both of these principles are prima facie, of course, and are overridden on some occasions either by the contrary testimony of others or by the discovery of facts or evidence inconsistent with the literal truth of the claims testified to.  In other cases, even sincere reports by otherwise impeccable witnesses can be impeached and rejected as incredible due to the background knowledge we possess which either excludes or makes highly improbable the literal truth of the claims being asserted.  Eyewitness reports concerning Bigfoot and the Loch Ness Monster fall into this category. While eyewitness reports provide some prima facie evidence for the literal existence of such creatures, the failure of monster hunters to provide any hard evidence for their existence - evidence of the sort we would reasonably expect to be able to acquire if these creatures did in fact exist - ultimately outweighs and undercuts the EP(5-T). In this case, hence the acceptance of the eyewitness evidence at face value.
	In the course of our brief survey of the sources of spontaneous belief, we have noted a number of ways in which each of them can be undermined on particular occasions.  In principle, of course, any one of our spontaneous beliefs or judgments could fall under the aegis of one of these undermining considerations.  Certainly, if we were to discover that, for any class of spontaneous beliefs, they were routinely undermined or refuted by such considerations, so that hardly any of them were acceptable ultima facie, we would by degrees lose confidence in the particular faculty that produced them and cease to rely on its deliverances in any more than a pragmatic fashion.  Happily, it is simply true as a matter of fact that this is not the case; only a small fraction of my spontaneous beliefs are ever called into question by my subsequent experience or reflection, hence need to be replaced or revised.  This fact helps to further bolster our confidence that these sources of spontaneous belief are in fact free of systematic flaw, since that they should produce beliefs of this sort is what we would expect to be the case if this were the case.  Nevertheless, we ought not to conclude this too quickly or too confidently until we examine at more length the concept of a defeater.  

Defeaters - Since each of the foregoing principles is only prima facie, each can be overcome or overturned by other considerations.  Such considerations, which trump our spontaneous beliefs, are called defeaters.  Each of the foregoing is subject to numerous defeaters, and I make no pretense to having any systematic account of  what a defeater is or exhaustive list of defeaters for every source of spontaneous belief.  However, it does seem to me useful to draw a distinction between two broad classes of defeaters, what we might call internal defeaters on the one hand and external (or global) defeaters on the other.  An internal defeater is one that arises from within experience and challenges or undermines individual spontaneous beliefs or isolable classes of such beliefs formed under certain circumstances.  All the defeaters mentioned in the last section were defeaters of this sort.  It is characteristic of defeaters of this sort that, while they undermine specific spontaneous beliefs, or isolable classes of those beliefs, they in no way tend as such to undermine our reliance on the cognitive faculties which produce those spontaneous beliefs.  Indeed, they are often the product of what appear to be internal mechanisms of self-correction operating to eliminate false prima facie beliefs produced by unusual circumstances or careless employment of the faculty on the part of its possessor. So, for example, suppose I see what appears to be my great aunt Maud standing on a street corner in a shady part of town, dressed provocatively and smoking a cigarette as she leans alluringly against a light standard.  Fearing the worst, I hasten to confront her and demand of her how she came to be in this low estate.  Approaching the woman more closely, however, I realize to my relief that it is not my great aunt Maud after all, but simply a woman wearing a wig giving her a superficial resemblance to that fine old lady.  Here I have an internal defeater of my original perceptual belief about my great aunt Maud resulting from my having taken a closer look.  Such a procedure undermines my original spontaneous perceptual belief but in no way undermines my reliance on sense-perception as a source of true beliefs about the world.  Indeed, it arguably presupposes it, since it assumes that the conditions under which I took my closer look were better - in the sense of more likely to produce a spontaneous belief that will hold up ultima facie - than those under which I formed my original, now overturned, belief.  Internal defeaters would only undermine my confidence in one of my faculties (e.g., visual perception) only if they routinely overturned my prima facie perceptual beliefs no matter the conditions under which they were formed, which I have asserted is not in fact the case.
	External defeaters are a different matter altogether.  An external defeater purports to find a reason, from some perspective external to the cognitive faculty it attempts to call into question, for distrusting the deliverances of that faculty in general.  An external defeater does not discriminate between those spontaneous beliefs issuing from that faculty are only prima facie those which stand up ultima facie.  An external defeater proposes to undermine all the deliverances of the faculty it critiques, thus denying that there is any such distinction to be made, at least in any sense other than a merely phenomenal or pragmatic one.  An external defeater proposes to show that the spontaneous beliefs produced by the faculty it calls into 
question are not credible regardless of how much initial plausibility they may possess and despite the absence of internal defeaters.  For this reason, we may also call these global defeaters because they are intended to undermine all spontaneous beliefs of a particular kind through undermining the faculty which produces them.
	I am aware of only three kinds of external defeaters.  The first class attempts to undermine our faculties by appeal to the existence of internal defeaters.  This is the strategy of the ancient skeptics, as testified by the lists of tropes compiled by Agrippa and Sextus Empiricus. Descartes, too, with his argument from perceptual error, uses this sort of strategy.  However, once we are clear about the distinction between internal and external defeaters, I think it will be fairly easy to block inferences of this sort.  A second strategy to produce external defeaters is to privilege one of the sources of spontaneous belief, i.e., rational intuition and bring it to bear on the other sources of spontaneous belief.  This is the strategy employed by the Eleatic, Megarian and Idealist schools of philosophy, who develop a priori proofs for the impossibility 
of change, motion and time, the truth of fatalism and so on.  These arguments are usually directed against sense-perception, but by extension also undermine the claims of memory, introspection and testimony.  However, we have seen no reason to privilege rational intuition as a source of spontaneous belief; while it purports to provide us with self-evident truths, it deliverances are merely prima facie.  Thus, if one of spontaneous beliefs produced by rational intuition seems to imply something absurd or unbelievable, this may be just as rightly construed as a reason for doubting the deliverances of the faculty of rational intuition in that case as a reason for accepting a general defeater for one of the other sources of spontaneous belief.  Thus, the attempt to use rational intuition to provide global defeaters for the other faculties can just as reasonably be thought to produce an internal defeater for rational intuition in this instance.
	The third form of general defeater is by far the most common and the most global.  This sort of defeater proposes to undermine all of the sources of prima facie spontaneous belief from some perspective beyond any of them.  In the twentieth century, numerous versions of  historicism, positivism/scientism, anti-realism, post-modernism, linguistic philosophy, etc., have attempted to undermine our confidence in what we might call the commonsense view of the world.  It is my conviction that all such attempts can ultimately shown to be self-refuting, self-undermining or otherwise incoherent.  It is not enough simply to say this, of course: one must be prepared to make this charge stick in each particular case.  However, since this is not something that I can undertake to do here, let me just explain why I think that this will invariably be the case and what this implies.  Attempts to find some point of view completely beyond that provided by the sources of prima facie spontaneous belief  inevitably presuppose in some way or other the very faculties they attempt to call into question, thus lapsing into self-refutation or incoherence.  What this demonstrates, if true, is that the presuppositions of the common sense point of view, i.e., the notions of (independently-existing) reality, (objective) truth and (the in principle possibility of) knowledge are also the presuppositions of rational discourse itself, guaranteeing that there is no coherently formulable perspective from which the sources of prima facie spontaneous belief could be undermined by any global defeaters.

Moses and the Burning Bush - Chapters 3 and 4 of Exodus tell the story of Moses and the Burning Bush, a theophany in which God performed a miracle and engaged in a conversation with Moses, commissioning him to go down to Egypt and free the Israelites from their slavery to Pharaoh.  According to the story, Moses encountered a bush which, though on fire, was not consumed by the flames.  Surprised and intrigued, Moses decided to investigate.  As he approached the burning bush, however, he heard an audible voice telling him to remove his sandals and uncover his head, as he is treading on sacred ground.  Recognizing the voice of the Lord, Moses did as commanded and then heard the Lord's message commanding him to undertake the liberation of the Israelites.  Although he protests and attempts to decline, the Lord assures Moses that he will receive the Lord's help and guidance in accomplishing this mission.  Finally convinced that the Lord has indeed chosen him to lead the Chosen People out of bondage in Egypt, Moses returns home to prepare for his journey.
	Moses, having encountered the burning bush, becomes convinced that he has witnessed a miracle and received a divine commission; because of this, he sets out to obey the divine command he has received from the Lord.  Presumably, if David Hume or Paul Weiss (not to mention myself in my younger days) had encountered such a bush or heard such a voice, they (and I as described) would probably have doubted that the experience was veridical (i.e., an illusion, dream or hallucination) and, in the extremity, even have questioned their (my) sanity under the circumstances.  Without a doubt, both they and I would have discounted the experience and refused to believe that we had received the commission and the divine help
promised to Moses and would have taken no steps to do what the Lord commanded on the grounds that probably no miracle had occurred.  The philosophical question arising out of this is the following: whose reaction and response, if anyone's, is more rational in the circumstances? Given the account of subjective rationality I sketched above, I believe that this question can be resolved in Moses' favor.
	Presumably, Moses is a human being of at least average intelligence and instinctively relies, just as we all do, on the sources of prima facie belief, such as sense-perception.  If Moses were to consider the question of whether or not there were any significant candidates for internal defeaters to his belief that he had witnessed a miracle, we can imagine him reasoning as follows:

	1.  Other than its extraordinary content, my experience of the burning bush was an 
                 ordinary sense-experience, involving visual and auditory data of the usual sort.

	2.  The conditions of perception were normal and of the sort which generally 
                 produce reliable perceptual beliefs - I could clearly see the burning bush, the 
                 Lord's voice was clear and distinct, etc.

	3.  I was not drunk, stoned, overtired or in any other way I am aware of likely to 
                 have misconstrued or misinterpreted my experience due to these or similar 
                 factors.

	4.  I am not normally subject to hallucinations or delusions nor do I have a history 
                 of mental illness or instability.

	5.  Therefore, my experience of the burning bush was veridical and I witnessed a 
                 miraculous theophany in which I was commanded to go down to Egypt and 
                 free the Chosen People from bondage to Pharaoh.

Undoubtedly, Moses then reasons that he ought to heed the Lord's command and set about the task to which that command binds him.  Again, lying back of this is an application of the EP along the following lines:  The prima facie best explanation of my visual experience of a burning bush and my auditory experience of hearing the voice of Lord is that I did see a burning bush and hear the voice of the Lord.  Given the lack of significant candidates for internal defeaters of those claims a la 1-4 above, Moses concludes that it is reasonable to accept his experience at face value and thus that he has witnessed a miracle.   My contemporary self thinks that he isright to do so, i.e., that Moses's belief, given his experience, is a reasonable one both to arrive at and act upon.

Moses’s Wife and the Acceptance of Miracle Claims on the Basis of Testimony - Now let’s suppose that Moses goes home and tells his wife (Zipporah) about his experience with the burning bush.  “Guess what”, says Moses, “today the Lord spoke to me from a burning bush and told me to go down to Egypt and free his chosen people from bondage to Pharaoh.”  What is she to make of this?  As we have seen, the relevant version of the EP in this context is the following, which Swinburne characterizes as the Principle of Credulity:

	The prima facie best explanation for X's claiming to have experienced E is that
	X in fact experienced E.

As such, that someone claims to have experienced E is always a reason for believing that he or she did in fact experience it.  Of course, there are numerous, well-known defeaters for such claims, as outlined above.  We can have grounds to question the veracity, acuity or even sanity of the individual who claims to have experienced some particular event, or strong background evidence to suggest that (despite sincere protestations to the contrary) that the person in question experienced no such thing.  In these cases, then, the experiential presumption in favor of X's testimony will be overridden and it will not be reasonable to accept his or her report at face value.
	How does this relate to Zipporah's evaluation of what Moses reports to her about his experience with the Burning Bush?  Being Moses' wife, Zipporah will likely be in a good position to judge the veracity, acuity and sanity of Moses.  She will be able to tell when he is likely lying, making a joke or playing a prank on her.  She will also be able to judge as to the reliability of the witness of Moses in matters involving visual and auditory perception and will know whether or not Moses is subject to delusions, hallucinations or other defects in sanity that would undermine his ability to distinguish fantasy and reality.  Finally, she would also be able to judge how credulous he is, i.e., how susceptible Moses is to fantastic or superstitious interpretations of his experience.  If, after due consideration of all of these possibilities, Zipporah concludes that none of these represents a significant internal defeater for Moses' claim to have encountered the Lord in the burning bush, then the experiential presumption in favor of that claim is not overcome and she can reasonably accept his claim.  The same will be true of Moses' other friends and relatives.
	What about ourselves?  Obviously, we are not personally in a position to judge the acuity, veracity or sanity of Moses.  However, the fact that Moses' claims were believed by others who apparently judged that he was sufficiently reliable to make it rational to accept his claims, passed down by them to others and ultimately written down in an authoritative text accepted by all those who are inheritors of that oral tradition also makes it reasonable for us to accept that story unless we have some reason for doubting that this "cloud of witnesses" can be taken at their word.  For example, if we had good reason for believing that this tradition were the product of some sort of conspiracy or passed on by people so stupid and credulous that their testimony has to be regarded as worthless, or possess independent evidence that such an event never occurred, then once again the presumption in favor of their testimony would be overridden.
	Of course, if one is Tom Paine or David Hume (or, for that matter, a contemporary scripture scholar), full of contempt for common people (Hume informs us that "The very pores of a gentleman differ from those of a common day laborer") and especially our remote ancestors, then this is exactly what one thinks.  The assumption that ancient people were "barbarous", credulous and child-like, hence unable to judge properly with regard to their own experience and easily duped by charlatans and mystery-mongers seems to be the foregone conclusion of deist and atheist writers who discuss miracles. In the same way, the general dishonesty of the authors of the Gospels is taken for granted by contemporary biblical scholars.  However, the only reasons for supposing these things stem from the content of the claims these ancient documents and authors make, not from any proof or evidence that our ancestors were incapable of judging the truth in factual matters or indifferent to the value of truth.  We have no reason for believing that ancient people were generally less intelligent or rational than ourselves despite the fact that they did not possess modern science and technology and any assumption to the contrary is simply a gratuitous expression of prejudice.  Moses and Zipporah in my examples do not use any principles of evaluation that wouldn't be just as valid for us, and which require no great sophistication in order to either derive or employ in the evaluation of miraculous event claims either from the first or the third person perspectives.  It should not be assumed that their judgments must be unreliable just because they involve the affirmation that a miracle occurred; that would be begging the question.

External Defeaters? - My last paragraph broaches a new topic, and the final one I will address here:  granted that there are no internal defeaters for Moses's and Zipporah's claims about the burning bush, are there external defeaters for miracle claims which fatally undermine such claims, no matter how well-attested in experience?  From the perspective occupied by my current self, I do not believe that there are, hence that it is rational to accept any miracle report for which there is an absence of internal defeaters of the appropriate kind.
	But apparently Hume and Weiss and my earlier self do not.  Why not? In my own case I can only report that I grew up in an atmosphere in which it was simply taken for granted that miracle claims were so extraordinary that they were intrinsically improbable, indeed, so intrinsically improbable that any alternative non-miraculous explanation of the same phenomenon, whether or not there was any evidence for it, was preferable, from a "rational" point of view, to the belief that a miracle had occurred.  This attitude was reinforced by two primary influences: first, "sophisticated " crypto-deistic theologians in the tradition of Schleiermacher and Bultmann who treated belief in miracles as merely a superstitious accretion on the true Christian message and unworthy of both God and modern man.  The second were my philosophy professors, most of whom were ideological atheists, who made constant reference to Hume's essay On Miracles as the final word on the subject.  In turn, Hume in his essay writes in so confident and dismissive a way that the impressionable mind of the young student is easily persuaded that his arguments are unanswerable.  I remember being confronted one day by one of my teachers (a philosopher, now dead, whom I respected then and still respect) who, instead of his usual greeting, stuck his finger in my face and asked "What is the greater miracle - that the Apostles lied or that Jesus rose from the dead?"  Taken aback, I responded that for human beings to lie was not a miracle at all. "Exactly!” he exclaimed in triumph, ending the discussion.   What brought this on I do not know, nor did I then (or even now) quite get his point, except that he regarded miracle claims as so highly improbable that there was no reason even to investigate them, since apparently it was always more likely that those reporting miracles were simply lying (or mistaken, or deluded, or insane, etc.) than that what was claimed was true.  Given this sort of intellectual background and training, it is not surprising that I had the attitude I did.
	Even so, it hardly seems to me, in retrospect, to be a particularly rational point of view, let alone the rational point of view about miracles.  In fact, it now strikes me as merely the expression of a kind of prejudice, what Lonergan called a scotosis, i.e., self-imposed intellectual blindness masquerading as rationality.  The characteristic feature of this scotosis is constant and systematic question-begging with regard to the issues in this area.
	For example, we are told that “extraordinary claims require extraordinary proof.”  However, I am aware of no (non-question-begging) argument for the thesis that a claim to have witnessed a miracle is an epistemically extraordinary claim.  For example, one could simply define any claim which touches on subject matters other than those revealed by common sense or science as “extraordinary”, but to do this would simply be arbitrary without further argument.  It is simply false to say that science or common sense or their combination rule out any claims other than those produced either by science or common sense.  Indeed, in this case, one can argue that, since the evidence of the miracle of the burning bush is derived from sense-experience there is a common-sense foundation for this miracle claim.  Nor can we say that miraculous events are extraordinary simply because they are unusual, surprising or unexpected events.  There are many such events that we have no difficulty at all accepting on the basis of sense-experience and/or the testimony of others.  And, of course, it would be transparently question-begging to argue that such events were extraordinary, hence the claims for their occurrence highly suspect, solely because they involved the appeal to supernatural agents or causes, since without further argument this is simply to assume that miracle claims have low intrinsic probability, which again begs the question against them.
	Are miracle claims suspect, hence extraordinary simply because they involve direct divine intervention in the world producing effects without the use of secondary causes (one construal of the claim that miracles involve “violations of the laws of nature”)?  It is hard to see why.  If God exists and is the Creator of nature and its laws ex nihilo, why not suppose that God could intervene in the natural order in such a way when He has a good reason to do so?  Again, in abeyance of an a priori proof for the non-existence of God, for the impossibility of miracles or of “violations” of the laws of nature, it is simply question-begging to assert this.  The fact that there is no prospect of any natural process producing a violation of the laws of nature is simply irrelevant to the claim that God could do so, so \cannot be used to show that miracle claims are intrinsically improbable.  In fact, on the assumption that God’s existence is possible, there might well be (as Swinburne argues) conditions under which the occurrence of a miracle might have high intrinsic probability, so that reports of such miracles would be expected, rather than unlikely, in those circumstances, hence eminently believable on the basis of sense-experience or testimony.
	Indeed, skeptical critics of miracles often commit the ignoratio elenchi fallacy in this context, arguing that since the claim that, e.g., a human being rose from the dead has low intrinsic probability (since, as far as we know, no natural mechanism can produce this outcome) so too must the claim that God raised Jesus from the dead.  But, of course, as we have seen, the first of these claims is completely irrelevant to the second, since the first deals with purely natural events and the second with an event produced through supernatural intervention in the natural order.  Indeed, the relevance of the first to the second is quite different from what skeptics about miracles take it to be, since, in fact, the physical impossibility of the event as the product of purely natural causes (such as coming back to bodily life after biological death or a non-parthenogenic virgin birth) actually strengthens the claim to a miracle, since it removes the physical possibility that these events are the products of natural processes that have simply been misinterpreted by those who experienced or witnessed them.
	Of course, if one had an a priori proof that no God exists, or that violations of the law of nature were somehow impossible, or could prove that God would never have a good reason to perform a miracle, then one would have an external defeater for all miracle claims, so that it would be reasonable to dismiss them out of hand.  Alternatively, if one could successfully argue (contrary to what I have said here) that miracle claims are so intrinsically improbable that no amount of evidence of the ordinary kind could make acceptance of such claims possible, then one would also possess an external defeater for all miracle claims based solely on the content of such claims.  For the reasons I have given, however, I see no prospects of anything of this sort being proven, nor any reason for thinking that we need any more evidence than that of the ordinary sort in order to establish a miracle claim as credible.
	Finally, neither is it the case that to say this leaves religious people in general and Christians in particular with absolutely no resources for assigning prior or intrinsic probabilities to miracle reports, so that we have no way to distinguish trivial and fantastic reports from those with initial merit.  Both scriptural tradition and philosophical theology present us with background information about God which serve to guide us in the evaluation of miracle reports.  In Scripture, for example, we find only three reasons for God to work miracles:  to help advance the divine plan for salvation history when there is no other way to do so, to testify to some religiously significant person or event (thus as a form of revelation) and as a response to sincere and heartfelt faith on the part of those who believe when this coincides with (or at least is not contrary to) God's overall plan for the world.  Indeed, many miracles do all of these simultaneously (e.g., Jesus' miracles of healing in the Gospels).  Given this background information, we can dismiss without further ado many purported miracle claims as intrinsically improbable.  It is unlikely, given the biblical criteria, that God would make Our Lord's face appear on a burrito, make statues bleed or open their eyes, cause the saints to levitate while they pray, and so on.  We would expect that overt miracles would be infrequent and unique events tied to specific divine revelations and have no reason to believe that God must perform periodic miracles designed to persuade people that He still exists, to reinforce the faith of the doubting or to convert the skeptical.
	This last point brings us back to Weiss and the early Duncan.  In Luke 16, Dives, roasting in Hell, begs Abraham to send Lazarus to his father's house to warn his five brothers to change their ways and thus avoid his own fate.  Abraham replies that they have Moses and the prophets (i.e., the scriptures) to guide them.  When Dives insists that only a miracle will cause his brothers to repent, Abraham replies "If they will not listen to Moses and the Prophets, neither will they be persuaded if someone should rise from the dead."  One can always discount any miracle, even one that one has witnessed oneself.  Someone who would prefer to distrust his own senses or question his own sanity rather than admit that he had witnessed a miracle, as I was inclined to do in my younger days, seems to me now to be dogmatically closed to the genuine possibility of such events, even if willing to admit that miracles are possible in the abstract, i.e., merely logically possible.  Even the actual occurrence of a miracle could have no effect on them, just as Christ's miracles not only did not convert everyone who witnessed them, but only made those opposed to his ministry hate and fear him all the more, strengthening their resolve to take his life.  But there is nothing of reason in this that I can detect and if people today tend to be skeptical about miracle reports, especially those concerning events in the past, it is not because we are more rational in this respect than our ancestors were.  Weiss and the early Duncan belonged to the class of those would not be persuaded, even if someone should rise from the dead.  If that is most of us, or at least most intellectuals, then, as far as rationality goes, so much the worse for us.  Religious believers will not heed them, nor should they if what I have been maintaining here is correct.  At any rate, the current Duncan is happy to have put this sort of thing behind him and laid the ghost of Hume's On Miracles to rest.

